Race-related civil disturbances in contemporary Britain: a case study of Pakistanis in post-2001 race riots Bradford

Dr. Hassen ZRIBA
University of Gafsa, Tunisia

Abstract

This article broaches the issue of race-related riots in the northern British city Bradford in the aftermath of the race riots of 2001. Such riots were read as symptomatic of lack of community cohesion and the immediate outcome of ethnic residential segregation and socio-cultural separateness. Yet, the author of the present article argues that what appeared to be ethnic responsibility for such civil disturbances is, in fact, an oversimplification of a complex and complicated factors that produced such morbid tensions in localities like Bradford. Even the claims of ethnic residential themselves are proved to be an exaggeration of the true local picture at best and mystification at worst. The article scrutinizes Pakistani ethnic minority in Bradford and shows how it is a diverse and a pluralist community in contrast to their mainstream stereotypical representation as a homogenous aggressive block.

Keywords: Residential segregation, Pakistani community, race riots, ethnic identity.

Les troubles d'origine raciale en Angleterre aujourd'hui: étude de cas des émeutes raciales parmi la communauté pakistanaise à Bradford en 2001

Résumé

Cet article aborde la question des émeutes raciales dans la ville britannique Bradford à la suite des insurrections raciales de 2001. Ces émeutes ont été lues comme symptomatiques du manque de cohésion de la communauté et comme le résultat immédiat de la ségrégation résidentielle ethnique et de la séparation socioculturelle. Ce qui semblait relever de la responsabilité ethnique dans les troubles civils est, en fait, une simplification excessive d'un des facteurs qui ont produit des tensions morbides dans des localités comme Bradford. Même les demandes de résidence ethnique se sont avérées une exagération de la véritable image locale au mieux et au pire une mystification systématique. L'article examine la minorité ethnique pakistanaise à Bradford et montre qu'elle est pluraliste contrairement à sa représentation stéréotypée de bloc homogène agressif.

Mots clés: Ségrégation résidentielle, communauté pakistanaise, émeutes raciales, identité ethnique.

الاضطرابات المدنية العرقية في بريطانيا المعاصرة :دراسة حالة الأقلية الباكستانية في مدينة برادفورد بعد أعمال شغب 2001

ملخص

يتناول هذا المقال بالدرس و التحليل الشغب والاضطرابات العرقية التي شهدتها مدينة بردفورد شمال بريطانيا في صيف2001 التي اعتبرت تهديدا مباشرا للتلاحم الاجتماعي ونتيجة حتمية للفصل السكنى على خلفية الانتماء العرقي و العزل الثقافي. لكن هذا المقال ينتصر لفكرة ما يبدو من الوهلة الأولى مسؤولية الأقليات العرقية على تلك الأحداث هو في الواقع تبسيط مبتذل لعوامل متعددة متشابكة أفضت لذلك الواقع الكئيب في بردفورد. يبدو من دراستنا أن مزاعم الفصل السكنى العرقي هي في الأغلب مبالغة في وصف الخيارات السكانية لأقليات المدينة العرقية وحفها بغموض مطبق. يتناول هذا المقال الأقلية العرقية الباكستانية في مدينة بردفورد ويبين كيف تعانى هذه الأقلية من تمثيل نمطي باعتبارها وحدة بشرية متجانسة و عدوانية خلافا لواقعها المعيش الذي يتميز بالتعدد والتنوع .

الكلمات المفاتيح: فصل سكاني، أقلية باكستانية، شغب عرقي، هوية إثنية.

1- Introduction:

Race riots have been a major feature of some British cities notably the city of Bradford. Many causes are detected and suggested to be the trigger of such civil disorder. It is believed by many theorists that one of the most dangerous stimuli of urban disintegration is ethnic residential segregation. Such urban division would create different worlds with different aspirations and identities. The cultural difference between polarized blocks would promote a mutual, to use Phillips's phrase, "strategy of avoidance" [(1)]**.** In this theory, peace seems to prevail as soon as the "strategy of avoidance" is maintained; otherwise, ethnic confrontation is expected. Whether this pattern is applicable to Bradford or not, what is important is that in the popular and official mind the 1995 and 2001 riots were read as racial in character and the direct or indirect outcome of inter-ethnic tension and ignorance. Such friction and ignorance were thought to be the result of the inability of whites and non-whites to intermix as a result of polarized ethnic residential segregation. Thus, ethnic minorities develop a strategy of self-defence while the host society stereotypes them and holds them responsible for the majority of social ills. Representing ethnic minorities in fixed stereotypical patterns overlooks the diverse nature of such minorities and breed fertile atmosphere for mutual ignorance and misunderstanding.

2-The "ethnic self-defence" discourse:

In his book *Race, Colonialism, and the City of London* (1973), the British sociologist John Rex attempted to provide a sociologically based explanation for racial discrimination and conflict by identifying inequalities in "market situations" [(2)] which fuelled conflict between indigenous workers and the newcomers. Such practices were also noticeable in the domain of housing allocation, leading to the creation and development of what came to be called immigrant colonies. Those colonies were a response to personal demoralisation and the social refusal of immigrants by the host community. Thus, Rex went on, community and immigrant organisation took on a political meaning [(3)] (Rex and Moore, 1967). Such political movements took the form of inter-ethnic community organisations. In Bradford, the Asian Youth Movement (AYM) of the 1970's was clear evidence of such political consciousness and organisation.

Rex and Tomlinson (1979) did research on the extent to which immigrant populations shared the class position of their white neighbours and white workers in general. The Rex-Tomlinson argument was based on the assumption that though immigrants shared some characteristics with the working class-white population, they remained to some extent different by virtue of their race. The substance of the analysis outlined a class structure in which white workers enjoyed certain rights which had been won through the long period of the working-class movement and the acts of the Labour Party. The result was-argued Rex and Tomlinson- that by the 1970's a situation of 'class truce' had developed between the white workers and the dominant social groups. Basing their analysis on Marshall's account of the welfare state, in which the salience of a shared citizenship outweighed the political importance of class as a source of political conflict and action [(4)]**,** they

argued that the development of welfare state institutions provided an important mechanism for shaping political mobilisation within the working class.

For Rex and Tomlinson the position of migrant workers and their communities was located outside this process of negotiation that had taken place between white workers and capital. They experienced discrimination in areas where the white workers had made significant gains (such as in employment, housing and education). Such exclusion from the rank and file of the host white community seemed to place the migrant workers outside the working class, in the position of an "underclass". Rex and Tomlinson believed that

> [T]he concept of underclass was intended to suggest…that the minorities were systematically at a disadvantage compared with their white peers and that, instead of identifying with working class culture, community and politics, they formed their own organisations and became effectively a separate underprivileged class(5).

Thus the minorities, according to Rex (6), became a "class for themselves". They developed their "reactive defensive political strategies" in order to deal with their exclusion from key economic and social arenas. And so, "the politics of defensive confrontation" emerged as a collective mobilisation of ethnic community efforts to fight against discrimination and alienation.

The above-explained emergence of defensive politics seemed to be heightened by a sense of ethnic minority difference from the host British community. In 1969, Rose and Deakin accounted for such rising racial consciousness, which seemed to contribute to polarizing inter-ethnic race relations:

> Pakistanis in Britain regard themselves as a people apart. They classify themselves as Kale (black), and Europeans as Gore Lok (literally 'white people)…The terms are continually used by the Pakistani immigrants, whether they are peasants, or members of the educated elite, and they serve to heighten the consciousness of racial, social and cultural differences(7).

Perception of differences between newly-coming ethnic minorities and the white community, as Rose and Deakin stated, seemed to create an identity crisis not only for the immigrants but also for the host community. Such a crisis of identity seemed to emanate from the uncertainty, instability and insecurity resulting from rapid change at all levels:

> Popular concern about identity is, in large part perhaps, a reflection of the uncertainty produced by rapid change and cultural contact: our social maps no longer fit our social landscapes. We encounter others whose identity and nature are not clear to us. We are no longer even sure about ourselves; the future is no longer so predictable as it seems to have been for previous generations(8).

The 1995 and 2001 race riots, Arun Kundnani thought, seemed to be the violence of those who had suffered marginalization and social exclusion. They were perpetrated by young South Asians, mainly Pakistanis. There is a need to compare the generation differences within the local Pakistani community in Bradford. Those who took part in the riots were mostly from the 16-25 age group. Generation differences may explain the events. Why were 1970's and 1980's Pakistanis much 'milder' in their reaction to their disadvantaged situation than the 1990's Pakistanis? Can the generation gap be a reason behind the race riots and the extent to which ethnic residential segregation explains them?

3-Generation differences and the question of identity:

The question of personal and social identity for young British-born Pakistanis (second and third generation) can be more complex than for their white counterparts. This is largely due to the deep gulf between the values and social conventions of the home on the one hand, and those of the school and the wider society on the other. They tend to find themselves torn between two different worlds and cultures. They seem to be a hybrid generation in a state of in-between-ness. To use the title of Taylor and Hegarty's book (1985), the immigrants' offspring constitute a *Half-way Generation* between two 'antithetical' worlds. Unlike the first generation of immigrants, the second- and third-generation Pakistanis seem to be more influenced by the host community's cultural values and norms.

The first generation migrated to Britain during the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. Very few came in the 1950's (2,100 in 1956, 5,200 in 1957, 4,700 in 1958 and 2,500 in 1960). The enormous numbers started in the 1960's from 25,100 in 1961, 25,080 in 1962, 16,330 in 1963, 10,980 in 1964 to over 7,000 in 1965, 8000 in 1966, and 21,176 in 1967 (9). They were largely rooted in their religious and cultural values; they were, to use Ghuman's expression, "very safe in their identity" (10). Generally, they had no intention of assimilation or integration. They were sojourners and questions of rights and recognition were not the top of their priorities. They were born elsewhere, outside Britain. Some were Pakistanis; others were East African Asians from the Indian Sub-continent (Indians and Pakistanis living in Kenya and Uganda). Nationalism and Africanisation precipitated this emigration[1]. However, for the British-born generations, things were different; the identity and identification process seemed to be challenging. They were faced by the conflicting demands of the home and the wider community on their loyalty and behaviour. This, obviously, led to a severe cultural problem from which young Pakistanis seemed to suffer in the 1990's. The process of adaptation and acculturation seemed to be punctuated by identity crises and social marginalisation. In her comment upon the motives behind the young rioters, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in "Bradford's Burning" referred to such an identity crisis:

> Many of the young Muslim men do not know who they are. Abused as "Pakis" all their lives, their parents and others have driven them to embrace a Pakistani identity that is a negation of their Britishness. Many in the older generation tell me that the youngsters are "too British, too much full of rights…Bloody fools…In Pakistan the police would kill them on sight" (11).

Though the above quotation focused mainly on the part played by parents in creating such an identity crisis, Alibhai-Brown went on to criticize traditional community leaders, politicians (local and central) and journalists for their failure to recognize such an identity crisis. Of course, many had recognized it and were trying to deal with it.

The traditional Biraderi system seems to have little relevance to Bradfordian Pakistanis than it was for the old generation. Considering themselves as British, the second and third Pakistani generations expect to enjoy the same citizenship rights like their white counterparts, to achieve more freedom of choice as individuals (negotiating crucial issues such as arranged marriage and place of residence). The

communitarian collectivist cultural practices of their community might be seen as obstructive to their individualistic rights which intensifies the generation gap and further alienates them [(12).]

Though bilingualism and biculturalism have well-known advantages for the development of the Pakistani character in Bradford, race relations sociologists such as Taylor (1976) thought that a promotional atmosphere was not always present. "I don't feel myself English, no not at all. I don't think I could…I could make myself think that I'm English, but I don't think I could even be English. I could be English in certain matters, but that doesn't mean that I think like I'm English" [(13)]. That was the attitude of a South Asian replying to a question of self-identification.

Unlike their fathers, the second and the third generations seemed to be more self-assertive. They no longer accepted the second class citizenship position or what Rex and Tomlinson (1979) called the underclass position. The spokesman for the Manningham Residents Association in Bradford, Manawar Jan-Khan, clearly expressed the shift in identity formation and maintenance within the offspring of Pakistanis in Bradford:

> We are very much the new generation of Asian young people with a distinct identity, which is still developing, but based on our desire to assert our rights as British citizens born and bred, free from the shackles of empire, yearning to be recognized for our abilities and given fair and equal treatment[(14)].

Jan-Khan affirmed that from the 1990's on, young Pakistanis in Bradford have not accepted alienation and marginalisation. The violent reaction of young Pakistanis to the racial practices of the National Front and the police, both in 1995 and 2001, is indicative of the change that the Pakistani community had undergone. He added that "[N]o one was prepared to let the National Front march into Manningham and people were determined to show that we would not take this like our parents did 20 years ago" [(15)]. Muhammad Anwar stressed such change when he wrote:

> …it appears that young Asians were not prepared to accept racial discrimination and harassment, particularly when they were working hard to integrate in education, business and other fields. Compared with the 1970's, young Asians in the 1990's were asserting their Britishness, and were more articulate and more aggressive in their approach to highlighting unfair treatment by the institutions of society. One example of this was the troubles in Bradford in 1995[(16)].

What Pakistanis seemed to ask for was recognition. They refused to be seen as units of labour and relegated to a second class position, or worse, that of an "underclass". Manningham and other Pakistani-dominated territories were considered by Jan-Khan and by other young people as their own territories. Any intervention in that area seemed to be an offence to them. Gill Cressey found in her study of young Pakistanis in Sparkbrook that young Pakistanis, being geographically far away from Pakistan or East Africa, have strong emotional ties with their immediate neighbourhood: "They know an inner city neighbourhood very well but have limited exposure to anywhere else. Often their discourse displays a loyalty to that location which Lee Back (1996) has named 'the nationalism of the neighbourhood'" [(17)]. The strategy of avoidance which young Pakistanis employ in their residential choices seems to be expected by them to be reciprocal. Pakistanis would not venture into what they perceived as white

territories; similarly, they would expect whites to do the same.

4-Pakistanis' perceptions of and attitudes to the race riots of 2001:

The local paper *Telegraph & Argus* did an opinion survey after the 2001 events of South Asians' attitudes about who was to blame for what had happened in July 2001. All the quotations below are taken from this survey on July 10, 2001[(18)]. The attitudes, as was expected, differed considerably. Some respondents thought that the events were unjustifiable and perpetrated by outsiders. Others blamed the local police's mishandling of the events. Yet others thought that it was owing to the police intervention that there were no deaths. Afatb Khan, 32, of Manningham echoed the attitudes of many residents. He affirmed that, "The people that did this are criminals and outsiders." He added that during the annual Mela there had been no trouble that might incite violence. However, Fahim Zamam, 32, believed that the National Front (NF) was the sole party responsible for the eruption of violence. Naser Hussain, 17, asked why the NF was allowed in the city; "The police didn't stop the NF, but when it came to us taking action, the police stopped us. Why didn't they stop the National Front from coming here?" The same accusation was uttered by Jamil Asheer,30.

Community leaders such as Rabnawaz Qureshi and Mohammad Riaz highlighted the unwillingness of the local police to help them calm down the rioters. Qureshi said, "We got the crowd to say they'd back off if they released the two guys they'd arrested. We asked the police to release them but when they refused we left it alone. We tried our best but the police said no." The spokesman for the Carlisle Road mosque in Bradford affirmed that the participants in the riots were not Asians only. There were also white and black people, most of whom were not Bradfordians. Nevertheless, like other community leaders, he thought that the police had failed to cooperate to calm the situation: "The police made some diabolical mistakes. The fighting started in the city centre and ended up in Oak Lane. Didn't they learn anything from 1995? And those white businesses should have been protected."

But Shazad Fazal, 27, disagreed. He thought that the police intervention had prevented more serious casualties. "If it wasn't for the police there would've been some deaths," he asserted, "you can't blame the police – if they're too heavy-handed people complain, and if they don't do enough people say they're soft. They can't win." Imtiaz Sabir, 32, from East Bowling, who accused community leaders and Bradford MPs of doing nothing good, affirmed that "as far as I'm concerned, Marsha Singh and Terry Rooney should resign. They've not done anything for Bradford. They're not good enough for the job."

Another attitude was expressed by Shezad Sheikh, 29, who implicitly blamed the rioters and stressed that true Muslim values had been distorted by a "hoodlum culture". He insisted that Islam and true Muslims were not involved in such riots. "If there was an ounce of Islam in them this would not happen," he affirmed.

The respondents identified four factors responsible for the events: the NF, the police, the MPs and the irreligiosity and immorality of those involved. A quick consideration of

South Asians' views about the events and their causes reveals how interrelated and complex the immediate causes of the riots were. Whether those views were representative of the overall community's perceptions is less important than that those different people had different opinions. Each saw and interpreted the events according to his/her conception of the relations between the community members, leaders, the police and the white extremists (NF). Also, the diversity of explanatory attitudes illustrates the intellectual diversity of the Pakistani community in Bradford. Pakistanis do not constitute a homogeneous group that entails a social, economic, cultural and intellectual sameness.

However, as a final respondent (Abdul Ghafoor, 31, from Shipley) said, such events would reinforce a notorious stereotypical image of Bradford, and this would harm every Bradfordian citizen, no matter to which ethnic group s/he belonged: "We are all going to suffer. Property prices will go down, insurance will go up." This would endanger Bradford's economic fortunes. Mohammed Amran, a community leader and a member of the local CRE, considered that the riots had damaged not only a community but the good work that had been done in the era. The future of race relations seemed to have received a devastating blow. The mainstream commonsense held ethnic residential segregation responsible for such blow and inter-ethnic tension.

5-The impact of residential segregation: (urban violence: 'race riots')

The relationship between ethnic residential segregation and the race riots in Bradford seems to be a problematic one. Do residential and social segregation lead to race riots, or vice versa? Or does the one reinforce the other? The answer to these questions is a difficult one. Some multi-ethnic and residentially segregated cities such as Leicester have not witnessed race riots similar to those that took place in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham [(19)]**.** However, it seems that race riots take place only when residential segregation implies social exclusion and economic deprivation [(20)].

There have been a number of explanations of the race riots and Pakistani residential segregation in Bradford. Generally speaking, residential segregation was interpreted as the outcome of a number of choice and constraint factors. Phillips and Ratcliffe (2002) presented a number of local factors that contributed to the shaping of residential patterns of South Asian minorities in both Bradford and Leeds. Such comparative data showed how a structure can govern the choice made by social agents, and how social agents can manipulate such a structure: the interplay of both personal choice and structural constraint. A plethora of explanations for the race riots that differed according to the difference of their ideological sources was presented. Yet ethnic residential segregation was considered as the most prominent cause of xenophobic attitudes, economic deprivation and social exclusion [(21)]. Such a situation would lead to inter-ethnic conflicts and clashes.

Investigation of the official discourse (and other non-official ones) showed that ethnic residential segregation in Bradford and elsewhere seemed to be perceived as self-imposed and a matter of choice. By analogy, the race riots, if seen as the direct outcome of self-

segregation, become largely the responsibility of the ethnic minorities themselves. However, ethnic residential segregation was the outcome of a mixture of choice and constraint factors, and the race riots themselves could be seen as the outcome of the same factors. This does not mean that the rioters chose to riot, but that they were constrained by prior constrained choices. They were also reacting against certain intra-community alienation and marginalisation. Pakistani young people – when they rioted – were doing so not only against the host community's racism but also against their being alienated even within their own community [(22)]. They were also expressing their rage against their being silenced in intra-community affairs. Shahid Malik, a member of Labour's National Executive, expressed his refusal of the Biraderi tradition within the Pakistani community that blocked women and younger potential political candidates from standing for office. This abuse of the British political system created a growing frustration among the younger Pakistanis, who found themselves unable to participate in shaping the future of their own community. Also, as Malik said, it contributed to the already disadvantaged situation of Pakistanis in Bradford and elsewhere in Britain. Zaffer Tanveer, the Bradford-based correspondent for the *Daily Jang*, one of Pakistan's leading newspapers, commented: "We miss out from having a voice because we are too busy looking inward and fighting among ourselves" [(23)]. When a candidate is chosen for office he will usually be a Biraderi elder from among the well-known community leaders. However, those community leaders seem to be unable to understand the interests and concerns of the younger population. Singh referred to the idea of 'community leaders' as "a redundant idea" [(24)] that was only relevant in the context of small, homogeneous groups in rural Pakistan. It could not work in heterogeneous, complex communities in Bradford. As far as the relationship between those leaders and the youngsters was concerned, Singh wrote that

> South Asian youngsters may feel no traditional obligation to or reverence for those leaders who they believe neither understand their problems nor have taken any positive steps to address their issues or concerns. It is wrong to assume that the community leaders are losing control over the youth. The existence of any such control has been a myth[(25)].

The community leaders were also criticized by the *Ouseley Report* as being unrepresentative of the concerns of their own communities in Bradford. Asking Bradfordians about their views of those leaders, Ouseley and his group managed to get a picture of the popular perception of those leaders which was largely negative. Some respondents affirmed:

> So-called 'community leaders' are self-styled in league with the establishment key people and maintain the status quo of control and segregation through fear, ignorance and threat[(26)].

Graham Mahony also referred to community leaders as one of the major causes of the disadvantages of the Pakistani community in Bradford. He explained that the Bradford local authority was unable to communicate with the local Pakistani community because of those community leaders who, according to Mahony, represented only themselves:

> Bradford has allowed itself to slide into a situation where it speaks to a self-selecting group of "community leaders" many of whom

are operating on personal agendas rather than speaking for their communities[27].

Nevertheless, those community leaders – though they may play a role in maintaining ethnic residential segregation – should not be made scapegoats for the race riots in Bradford. There is a line of argument that exempts them from the heaviest part of the responsibility. They were considered as the direct outcome of the multiculturalist policies of the 1980's[28]. The 1980's witnessed, according to Kundnani and Malik, the emergence of multiculturalism as a policy to replace anti-racism. Malik, Kundnani and others thought that one of the major underlying reasons of ethnic residential and social segregation, as well as the resulting race riots, was the advent of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism was considered as more dangerous and divisive than racism itself. Paradoxically, multiculturalism, presented as a cure to racism, had become, according to many critics, the very disease that weakened the anti-racist camp.

As claimed in the segregation discourse, ethnic residential segregation was the major stimulus to the race riots. John Denham and Ted Cantle did not deny the prominence of other factors such as the irresponsible behaviour of racist groups and the inflammatory media coverage of race and ethnic issues. Yet they deemed ethnic residential segregation as the pivotal cause. The official discourse of ethnic residential segregation identified ethnic residential segregation as a major cause of urban disintegration and violence but failed to highlight the prior causes underlying 'the major cause'. Denham acknowledged that it was difficult to distinguish causes from results in considering the relationship between ethnic residential segregation and urban violence, but this did not prevent him stressing residential segregation as the primary evil. Second, the official segregation discourse seems to base its conclusions on general perceptions of residential segregation as a negative phenomenon. But it could be argued that residential segregation is not always a negative thing; it can be good in certain contexts. Third, the claim that Pakistanis are living in self-segregated "comfort zones" cannot be sustained since residential segregation can also be the product of external constraints, and thus, a forced segregation. The fourth shortcoming of the official discourse was its failure to distinguish between residential segregation and the fast ethnic minority demographic growth. There is an anti-discourse in Bradford that claims that segregation was a myth. The subsequent section considers the desegregation discourse, which seems to invalidate the claims of ethnic residential segregation in Bradford. If the desegregation discourse actually reflects ethnic residential reality in Bradford, the claim that the race riots were the direct outcome of ethnic residential segregation turns out to be unfounded.

6-The desegregation discourse:

The segregation claims in Bradford did not go unchallenged. Ludi Simpson, of the Bradford Resource Centre Rasalah (2002), questions the validity and credibility of the segregation discourse. In an article entitled "The legend of self-segregation: what are they talking about?" in response to the prevailing discourse of ethnic self-segregation, he refers to the disaster with which segregation is usually

associated: it will result in the disintegration of urban society. Terms such as "self-segregation" and "white flight" are perceived as problems, particularly for the white community.

Ludi Simpson criticizes this segregation discourse and considered that "[C]laims of polarisation are legends, passed orally like folk tales"[(29)]. Simpson believes that race related statistics were often used to reinforce misleading racial stereotypes which would hamper any appropriate social policy. He argued that previous studies, on which the central Government had built its current community cohesion policies, were at best inadequate. Such studies, Simpson argues, lacked "consideration of change over time" and confounded "population change with migration" [(30)]. What seemed to be an ethnic increasing cluster in the inner city was, in fact, the impact of natural population growth. In addition, segregation was always interpreted negatively. Simpson thinks that while the national CRE agreed on the negativity of those terms, locally, segregation was not all negative.

Simpson considers the Index of Segregation which was used to measure ethnic residential segregation in Bradford as "a very broad measure" in that it "does not distinguish the Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian populations within 'South Asian'" [(31)]. Also, the Index failed to look at what was happening in specific areas of Bradford. Simpson considers that failure an important omission in the presentation of the true picture of ethnic segregation in Bradford. He offers quantitative data on the level of ethnic segregation in the Bradford wards and Enumerated Districts. The data appears in the table below.

	1991	**1996**	**2001**
Index of segregation: 30 electoral wards	0.59	0.59	0.59
Index of segregation: 927 EDs (100-250)	0.75	0.74	0.74
Wards			
75% and higher South Asian residents	0	0	0
25%-75% mixed South Asians and Other	5	6	9
75%-95% Other	9	9	6
95% or more Other	16	15	15
EDs (100-250 households)			
95% and higher South Asians	0	1	0
75%-95% South Asians	29	43	77
25%-75% mixed South Asians and Other	152	154	163
75%-95% Other	129	136	134
95% or more Other	617	593	553

Table 1: **Index of ethnic segregation in Bradford [(32)]**

Relying on the data presented in the table above, Simpson could argue that segregation indices are not as high as was generally claimed in the official and media discourse. He also showed that segregation becomes more remarkable when the measure unit is smaller, thus segregation is more noticeable at street level than at ward or neighbourhood level. Equally important was his finding that segregation has not increased over the 1990's whether large or small measure units were used. The number of more mixed areas increased during the decade. Thus, what was increasing was residential mixing not

"polarisation in residential patterns" [(33)]. Such a centrifugal move of ethnic minorities from the core of the community demographic cluster was mainly enhanced by the amelioration of the ethnic minorities' economic fortunes.

A basic misunderstanding of South Asian residential patterns explained the official failure to distinguish between the increasing natural demographic growth of the South Asian communities and their residential cluster. The increase in the number of the Pakistani community in Bradford because of natural growth outnumbered the steady out-migration to outer areas of Bradford. Also, continuous immigration from the Indian Sub-continent, coupled with lower white fertility and demographic growth, led to the ever-increasing demographic disequilibrium between the two groups. The youthful structure of the South Asian population compared to the white sustained such a demographic disequilibrium. Table 2 shows the difference between the two groups at the level of age structure (the white-dominated wards are chosen at random).

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Age	University	Bradford Moor	Toller	Odsal	Wibsey	Baildon	Bradford
Under 16	26.7	33.7	31.2	22.9	22.7	18.3	23.4
16 to 19	10.5	7.5	7.4	5.3	5.6	4.4	5.6
20 to 29	28.4	16.8	17.9	12.9	11.2	9.5	13.4
30 to 59	24.2	30.8	30.4	39.0	40.7	43.4	38.7
60 to 74	7.3	7.5	9.0	13.0	13.1	15.4	12.2
75 and over	2.9	3.8	4.0	6.9	6.8	8.9	6.8
Average age	27.6	28.7	29.9	37.0	37.4	41.6	36.4

Table 2: **Comparison of age structure in some Bradford wards [(34)]**

As the above table shows, the age structure in the Pakistani-dominated wards was much younger than that in the white-dominated ones, which partially explains the greater demographic growth of Pakistanis in Bradford. The same pattern is noticeable in other District wards. Thus a ward such as University is more likely to grow in number because of natural growth than Baildon. University would increase its numbers owing to its young population (those aged between 16 to 29 represented 38.9% of University ward population, whereas in Baildon they were only 13.9%) while Baildon would be likely to lose its population naturally because of its relatively old

population (those aged between 60 to 75 and over constituted 24.3% compared to only 10.2% for University). Thus, as Simpson asserted, there should be a distinction between natural demographic growth, immigration from the Indian Sub-continent and ethnic residential self-segregation. What should be focused on, he thought, was the internal migration and movement of both white and non-white populations in order to get a true picture of ethnic residential changes:

> It will also be essential to identify the contribution of migration within Britain, separately from that of overseas immigration and births and deaths. It is migration within Britain that would be responsible for self-segregation, and this has been shown to have an opposite pattern to overall population growth(35) .

Equally important was the report issued by Deborah Phillips *et al* (36) *Movement to Opportunity? South Asian Relocation in Northern Cities*. The report showed that though ethnic segregation was a real and tangible phenomenon, there was some evidence of ethnic desegregation and suburbanisation. Also the report accused some ethnic issues-interested organisations such as the Commission on the *Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* (*Parekh Report* 2000) and other academic researchers of paying little attention to urban segregation and underplaying "the central issues of processes of change and implications of these changes for our urban futures"(37).

Thus, *Movement to Opportunity?* was intended to correct such shortcomings by providing comparative data for the two major cities of West Yorkshire: Leeds and Bradford. Such comparative data would help to decipher the processes and causes behind ethnic segregation and desegregation using a multi-method study such as surveying, in-depth interviews and focus groups (qualitative and quantitative data).

One of the major findings of the research was that there was a slow but steady process of ethnic desegregation. Yet this process of suburbanization was governed by a number of choice (cultural) and constraint (discriminatory) factors. Importantly, it was also governed by the economic prosperity of ethnic minorities in particular and that of the city in general. Leeds was enjoying more economic prosperity than Bradford. Such prosperity fostered "a higher level of minority suburbanisation in Leeds" (38).

However, the report noticed that the extent of segregation between the various sub-categories within the South Asian category (Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani) varied considerably both in Leeds and Bradford. Thus, it seemed that economic factors, though important, were not totally responsible for Muslim Pakistani residential patterns either in Leeds or in Bradford.

Nevertheless, ethnic segregation seems to be higher in Bradford. True, Bradford is comparatively less prosperous than Leeds, but Muslims represented 60% of Leeds's South Asian population while it was it was 83.2% in Bradford (Census 1991). Yet according to the Report, the same patterns of residential clustering along religio-cultural lines were noticed in the two cities. Though Leeds-based Muslims outstripped their counterparts in Bradford in benefiting from economic prosperity and thus were comparatively more suburbanised, they remained, compared to the Sikh and Hindu populations, more segregated

both geographically and socially. According to the Report, "…the beginning of Pakistani movement into outer areas was also evident although it was on a relatively small scale compared with the Indian group" (39).

It seemed that suburbanisation was not, as the *Ouseley Report* claimed, a "white flight" but rather a middle class flight. Phillips *et al* (2002b) considered the phrase white flight as "sensationalist" (40) and misleading. The white demographic loss more accurately, she thought, reflected the death of older white residents as well as out-migration through housing mobility. Financially able Bradfordians, either white or non-white, aspired to escape the physical deprivation associated with the inner urban areas. The term "white flight" gives such urban change a racial dimension which would obscure the true picture of suburbanisation in Bradford and elsewhere. However, there were exceptions. The Report discovered that almost one in five households in the traditional "comfort zones" had the financial ability to move but preferred to stay. Such a percentage (20%) of people who voluntarily chose to remain shows the interaction and interplay of both choice and constraint factors in determining the spatial distribution of ethnic minorities in both Leeds and Bradford. The dichotomies of choice vs. constraint and structure vs. agency seem to be important in shaping ethnic residential patterns not only in Bradford but also in Leeds and elsewhere.

Equally important was the process of ethnic redistribution and relocation outside inner urban areas. The report discovered a re-clustering process. The already formed inter-ethnic divisions in the inner city seemed to be maintained after suburbanisation:

> These ethnic/religious divisions were often maintained in moves to the suburbs. Signs of re-clustering along religious group lines were clearly evident from the distribution maps for Leeds, and similar trends were evident in the less well developed suburbanisation process in Bradford (e.g. in Heaton) (41).

That process was mainly to maintain emotional and religio-cultural ties and identity. Middle-class Pakistanis, when they decide to leave the core inner city community, reside not far away from it. They move not because they want to assimilate into the mainstream host society but because they wish to move to more socio-economically prosperous areas, since they "tend to see the inner areas as overcrowded and suffering from rowdiness and violence (from both white and Asian youth)" (42).

To sum up, the message conveyed by *Movement to Opportunity?* as well as Simpson's essay was that contrary to the post-2001 race riots official discourse, South Asian minorities' residential segregation was not on the increase. On the contrary, there was evidence of slow but steady residential desegregation. The extent and pace of such residential change differed considerably among South Asians. Sikhs and Hindus started their suburbanisation from the 1980's whereas Muslims followed during the 1990's. Indians seem to be more geographically and socially mobile than Pakistanis and Bangladeshis both in Bradford and Leeds. The official reports seemed to have missed or at least under-considered those intra-South Asian differences. Intra-sub-South Asian categories such as Pakistanis have their internal specificities according to their class and gender differences. Yet they tend to be

considered as a group rather than as individuals. Thus, their differences seem to be disregarded or relegated to a lower position. In addition, the official reports seem to foster a negative image of ethnic residential segregation since they avoid highlighting the positive aspects of residential segregation. Terminologically, the use of the expression "self-segregation" tends to stress choice factors while ignoring constraint ones. The binary division of choice vs. constraint factors was not always workable. Constrained choices (by internal and external structures e.g. discrimination and cultural togetherness) could be more useful. Deborah Phillips *et al* called them "bounded choices" (43). Such choices were mainly the product of the "strategy of avoidance" (44) and arguably the "diasporic experience". The anti-ethnic segregation discourse seemed to prove that residential segregation in Bradford was a myth; thus, "[C]ontrary to the popular perception that South Asians, especially in places like Bradford (Bradford Race Review, 2001), prefer to self-segregate, we found evidence of the desire for more mixing on the part of all ethnic/religious groups" (45). What the official reports considered as increasing segregation was, according to Simpson, a description of the natural demographic growth and immigration from the Indian sub-continent of the South Asian population.

The measurability of residential segregation has not been a tenable and consensual process. A number of problems intervene in the production of ethnic residential statistics. It has been generally claimed that Pakistanis are self-segregated in the inner city. Yet a further definitional problem arises: the notion of 'inner city'. In 1996, the Bradford Commission pointed that the definition of 'inner city' was a highly dynamic and ambiguous one. Different official bodies use different definitions and criteria. The Education, Police and Social Services employ different boundaries which reflect their specific responsibilities. The boundaries are drawn and influenced by different funding formulas and institutional structures. They are continuously shaped and reconstructed by social and temporal changes. Bradford Commission stated:

> Some official publications classify the inner city in Bradford as composed of five electoral wards and the outer city as composed of some 15 wards, on the basis of demographic trends… Although inner city Bradford, defined in this way, is often portrayed as an area inhabited predominantly by Pakistanis, the majority of residents are White(46).

To conclude, the question of Pakistani residential segregation in particular and that of ethnic minorities in general has been a controversial one. Prior to the 2001 race riots, and after these events, the official discourse (both locally and nationally) identified residential segregation as the major stimulus to inter-ethnic tension and friction. Yet an investigation of the local statistics, and mainly the dynamics of demographic mobility and growth, showed that – though numerically residential segregation had been on the rise during the 1990's – there is a slow but steady process of suburbanisation among South Asian minorities in Bradford. The pace of the process has been different among South Asians: it was more rapid and older (dating back to the 1980's) among Indians than among Pakistanis or Bangladeshis. Similar trends were

obvious in Leeds, but with a different pace and size.

7- Conclusion:

In the aftermath of the 2001 race riots, urban residential segregation was popularly perceived as the major cause of urban disintegration, disconnecting any inter-ethnic links in Bradford. Such ethnic residential polarisation was likely to nourish inter-ethnic prejudice and stereotyping. This article tried to study the dialectical relationship between ethnic residential segregation and race riots. Following Rex and Tomlinson's model of "the politics of defensive confrontation" (47), the race riots of 1995 and 2001 in Bradford can be read as the reaction of an alienated 'underclass' of Pakistani young people who were suffering from socio-economic exclusion by the mainstream society. However, to claim that the young people were expressing a widespread dissatisfaction within their own community would be misleading. The older generation seemed to be less concerned with their socio-economic situation. They were widely perceived as behaving like sojourners who would one day return to their original homeland, Pakistan, or as refugees from Africa. However, their offspring seemed to be torn between two different cultures. They seemed to be excluded by the host community and at the same time they were severely controlled by their own elder co-ethnics. Such a situation created severe questions of identity and belonging, which intensified the intra-community generation gap. This cluster of intra- and extra-community pressures seemed to push them to riot. Ethnic residential segregation seemed to be a contributing cause of the 2001 race riots in Bradford. Unlike the official discourse, which considered it as the major cause, local evidence showed that young Pakistanis were dissatisfied with certain intra-community practices. For instance, Shahid Malik complained of the abuse of British democracy by the 'Biraderi' system. Malik was conveying a general sentiment of young Pakistanis that they were being used to serve certain trans-local goals. Such political practices, along with other socio-cultural ones (e.g. arranged marriages), were always a source of tension between the first generation and the subsequent ones.

However, when asked about their perceptions of and attitudes to the 2001 riots, Pakistani people provided different points of view which reflected their different social class belongings and positions within the community. Young people who lived in the inner city blamed the police and the racist interventions of the BNP. Those who lived in the better-off areas like Shipley expressed their concern about the economic damage that those riots were likely to bring about. Such diverse points of view show that, unlike the popular perception that sees ethnic minorities as homogeneous groups, the ethnic people themselves constitute heterogeneous communities whose differences might even transcend their similarities.

It was claimed that ethnic segregation was the main cause of urban violence. This residential segregation was also claimed to be growing. Nevertheless, some local social geographers (48) challenged the idea of ethnic residential segregation persistence. They claimed that what appeared to be growing ethnic segregation was, in fact, an ethnic

demographic evolution caused by natural growth and continuing immigration from the Indian sub-continent. On the contrary, they noticed a slow but steady process of ethnic desegregation, which suggested that the official segregation discourse was building its conclusions on a 'myth'.

However, it is important to show that this desegregation discourse was, like the segregation discourse, creating its own 'myth' when it tried to invalidate the segregation discourse. It was obvious statistically that segregation was increasing. Also, to claim that ethnic concentration was a mere reflection of demographic growth and inflow immigration presented, simply, one part of the truth only. The choice-constraint argument showed that ethnic residential segregation was the outcome of both proscriptive and self-ascriptive factors, which means that desegregation itself can be governed by the same processes that govern segregation.

Thus, even if desegregation occurred, it would be, as Phillips *et al*[(49)] and Peach [(50)] noted, a kind of residential relocation which meant that segregation would persist even when better-off ethnic minorities quit the core community.

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